The Black Swan moment for Management Consulting is already underway

Big Bets worked in the past because of clout, monopoly power and other top down thinking and a world that didn’t have freedom of expression democratized for all.  Left to the market’s free will and people’s power, a lot of these old concepts of Taylorism will neither work nor contribute to any real value in the future.  Taylor’s ideas were just instruments of the large machineries in place to thwart freedom of expression and creationism that would have otherwise blossomed organically. The future is about learning through experimentation in an open information age.  That age is real because technology, social networks and globalization have become the proxy for the invisible hand that Adam Smith would have loved to see at work.

A lot of money was made doing things one way in the past, but as the evidence is piling up on how that can’t be made now, repeating patterns from the past as a way to success in the future is another cognitive bias that we will continue to hear from the incumbents and power mongers from 20th century successes.

The future is in the hands of polymaths and people with expert power (as in knowledge of subjects and experience gained through that knowledge, not plain experience of doing something repeatedly).  The utility of creationism trumps the utility of plain analysis that is available for a much lower cost and cannot be gamed as it was in the past.

This has huge relevance to the management consulting industry that has been operating in a linear model hiring MBAs out of business schools with no actual operational experience of building something, running something and then bringing those insights back to business.  If everyone were to make their powerpoints from reading a Gartner and Forrester bar chart or a month long survey, with no hands on experience in building or running a product or service business, or the intuition based on relevant experience gained from that process, then how am I to trust the consultant’s recommendation?   That could be easily switched to a crowd sourced model or just plain common sense or dumb luck as some would call, because there is no guarantee of success in the old analyst model.

The failures of Enron and Wall Street more recently, all indicate one simple truth – strategy by design is a colossal failure and value destroyer.  Letting freedom of expression and organic growth blossom is the way of the future.  This is a hard thing to digest for highly paid management consultants and corporate executives who have no clue what others think of them.  If we do a study of the corporatti of how much someone would recommend working with them (similar to the Net Promoter Score that Bain consultants came up with for how much a brand would be recommended by a customer), the results would not be shocking to many people.  People that have coercive power are loathed across the board.  I don’t know of people that loved Saddam Hussein or Hosni Mubarak.  Because power corrupts power absolutely.

What should large corporations do now?

  • Start experimenting with little bets and grow with the new age, again.  That is the route to corporate renewal.  Not another top down strategy that is fiction at best in packing more blades in a razor with $200M R&D and marketing lipstick on pigs.
  • Approach objective 3rd party expert advice differently.  Just because someone markets themselves as ‘expert’ or ‘objective’ doesn’t necessarily mean they are.

As Reid Hoffman says in his new book, the fastest way to change yourself is to hang out with people who are already the way you want to be.   [For example, hire entrepreneurs as your consultants.  Check out TakeOut, a company bringing entrepreneurs to brainstorm with corporations instead of Big Bet top down studies.  Read this article.]

If your stodgy management consultant is not ready to embrace change and demonstrate how the consultant’s firm has renewed itself, you know what to do.

Let us welcome the era of experiments and celebrate little bets.  In fact that isn’t that how evolution works?

 

Why it’s hard to re-imagine business strategy

Google canceled the Google Buzz project Friday – another failure in its social foray.  The jury is still out on Google+ (notwithstanding reports of 60% drop in traffic recently)

Other companies have faced similar predicaments.  IBM reinvented itself, not because of Lou Gerstner alone.  The company was staring bankruptcy when he joined in 1993.  Apple has had enormous success in the last 10 years.  But all of that is not just Steve Jobs.  The company was staring at bankruptcy when Steve Jobs joined.  In both cases, the company DNA had to undergo mutation in the face of something that shook their core beliefs.  Their current products and business model were not working.  They had to change or perish.

Here’s an interesting anonymous response on Quora for what it takes to make change at Google.  It is dated (May 2010), but still relevant, almost a year and half later.  To quote from that post:

What is really happening is that Google is so successful of a company and so much of its sub-organizations and influential leaders are vested in its current direction that any attempt to do something truly different in order to win (or apparently, do even reasonably okay) at social is quickly snuffed out.  Only efforts which are twisted into formulae amenable to Google’s existing strengths and dominant paradigms are allowed to proceed, and we see what results.  It’s the same thing that happened at Microsoft (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/opinion/04brass.html?ref=opinion).

“Only when they truly have something real to lose – collectively and individually – will the motivation to perform emerge.”

 

Google Store: +1 for an experimental way to retail strategy

I love the idea when Google, the #1 Internet brand is starting small with a 285 sq ft retail footprint in London to test, learn about retail marketing.

If Google had gone full blast, made an announcement about how it was going to launch 200 stores in the next one year all over the world do you think it would have made sense or would Google be successful in the retail venture?

Kudos to managers at Google for the agile way to experiment and learn.

 

 

VMware’s acquisitive growth strategy: A study – Part#1

This post also appeared on my  Building4 blog.

At VMworld 2011, VMware CTO Steve Herrod gave a compelling roadmap of how the company is forging ahead.  If you look under the covers, a lot of the underlying technology and consequently growth, for VMware comes from a series of acquisitions over the last two years.  Take a look at two exhibits below:

Here are some questions that are worth considering:

  1. Acquisition pattern and strategic intent: Is there a pattern in how VMware went about acquiring the companies in the picture? Did managers at VMware formulate a strategic intent on how they were going to offer a vision of VMView that is now (or at VMworld 2011) being offered, back in 2009? Or did they just stumble into it?  In other words,  was this acquisition picture carefully orchestrated, or simply a series of experiments that created a coherent picture much later?
  2. Acquisitions, growth and innovation:  For technology companies, are acquisitions the only way to grow?  How can a technology company that serves enterprise users innovate continuously?  Is that innovation coming out of acquisitions only? (what about scaling?, integration?)
  3. Leadership change: Did a CEO change contribute to any of the change in VMware’s growth?
  4. What can managers facing disruptive forces do in light of 1, 2 and 3 above?

I don’t have answers to these questions (because I’m not privy to how managers at VMware made these decisions!), but I’ll offer my point of view as an observer.  In this post, I’ll expand on question 1) and follow-up with another for the other two questions.

Zig-zag?

First on the acquisition pattern and strategic intent:  If you had followed VMware pre-Aug 2009, they had only acquired 6 companies until that time, and all of them were directly related to their virtualization technology, except possibly one (TRANGO Processors) which was about running VMs on mobile phones and even that was too close to virtualization.

Until VMware acquired SpringSource, there were no significant events in core enterprise technologies (read: impacting developers) for VMware.  Most strategists at the time VMware acquired SpringSource would have thought the naturally adjacent for the hypervisor would have been a management technology for the hypervisor, not a developer framework.  But VMware declares its intentions for a bigger vision by acquiring a development platform.  Or did managers at VMware really know Spring was going to serve VMware’s PaaS forays today?  In fact,  even managers within VMware would have questioned on why invest in something so far from what VMware was already doing is good.  That would have been a tough pill to swallow – managers would have after all wanted investments driving their current product lines not a new category.  You’ll see over this period of active acquisitive growth, VMware goes about collecting pieces on the chess board small, unrelated, yet opportunistic assets as some might say.

What does VMware do after acquiring SpringSource? You’d think immediately after acquiring SpringSource, VMware would go and acquire a bunch of technologies close to SpringSource to “complete the stack” for developers.  Actually, VMware didn’t do that at all.  It switched all the way up and out to a hosted email service (Zimbra) next.  That acquisition was puzzling to many watchers.  That made no sense to the casual observer.

SaaS? Developer? Operations? All of the above?

Did VMware want to play in the SaaS marketplace?  Did VMware want to get into the collaboration software business?  If that were true, you’d think at this point in time,  they’ll go and buy a set of SaaS assets to play in the desktop application space.  Not until two years after (i.e. just a few months back), did they acquire three more SaaS assets (SlideRocket, DigitalFuel and SocialCast) to make a “starter pack” for enterprise SaaS.

Is it possible that Zimbra was an “experiment” for VMware?  To test the application space? Maybe Yahoo’s divestiture was just a serendipitous moment for VMware to enter the application space so far away from the hypervisor.  Yet, today, it looks so naturally close to it.

After acquiring Zimbra, VMware acquired a whole bunch of management technology assets from parent company EMC.  My guess is, around that time virtualization was already getting to the tipping point of large-scale adoption, and management of virtual machines was becoming a problem.  So VMware changed gears, and acquired management technologies to beef up its vCenter portfolio.

Soon after VMware moved further down the stack (from management) and acquired Rabbit MQ.  Why?  AMQP was emerging as the best protocol for messaging in middleware and Rabbit MQ implementation was the perfect integration that someone who already had Spring would look for to broaden enterprise adoption of Spring.

But wait.  If you thought VMware was paying attention to developers only then  you are wrong.  Suddenly cloud became the buzz word everywhere and security the #1 concern to cloud adoption.  What does VMware do?  Strengthen security with TriCipher and NeoAccel acquisitions.

Again, VMware switches back to developer needs acquiring an IDE (WaveMaker).

Enterprise Collaboration SaaS Starter Pack (yes, that’s a lot of words)

Finally VMware goes back to actually completing a simple usable starter pack, it started almost 2 years before with that Zimbra experiment. So SaaS starter pack = Zimbra + SlideRocket + SocialCast – which can, conveniently be bundled with their resurrected VMView at VMworld 2011.  Pretty impressive, eh?  At VMworld, I chatted with Javier Soltero, CTO for SaaS, App Services at VMware and he asked me (I should say, gleefully) “does it all make sense now?”  Of course, it does!  In fact, my colleague Cote has a “we get it post” aptly titled The VMworld 2011 Application Story.

Deliberation vs Experimentation

But did managers at VMware set out on this journey with deliberate intent? Was there strategic intent at VMware in August 2009 to be where it is today? I would argue it doesn’t look like that at all.  The portfolio looks like a zig zag map that got filled out progressively (and will continue to) and the puzzle appears to be getting solved.  Well, sort of.

Last week, I had the opportunity to speak with Michael Dell – himself an incredible experimenter – no less than creating a $61B global technology leader that he started out of his college dorm room.  I asked him what drives good strategy.  His response was direct – two words – “listening, learning”.

If you look at VMware’s acquisition strategy, it seems to fit that description.  But do we know that?  Is VMware adopting an Agile acquisitive strategy? (small experiments, little bets, listening and learning, iterative continuous improvement) – More on all of this in post#2.

 

Henderson & Porter’s work and what happened to experiments

Something very fundamental is broken  in large corporations.  The ability and spirit to experiment as a corporate function.  Managers are:

  1. chasing short term results that improve existing operations with traditional strategies (cost cutting, outsourcing, value chain improvement, and the like) and/or
  2. designing large 3 – 5 year plans and multi billion dollar acquisitions, predicting where the markets would move (supported nicely by multi horizon pictures supplied by management consultants) and/or
  3. buying their way into successful experiments (=acquiring successful start ups) after the fact, not before – losing the ability to experiment from within.

I have a hypothesis on why experiments have taken a back seat:  The adoption of Henderson and Porter’s work (and by extension traditional management consulting work)  negatively impacted experimentation as a strategy discovery tool.

Bruce Henderson and Michael Porter are two of the most celebrated strategy theorists in recent times.  Much of corporate America, MBA consultants and academicians revolve around the Experience Cuve, Growth Share Matrix and Five Forces work the two published.  Henderson’s study of experience curve‘s effects on business is about how mass production and the experience of it can give advantages to companies in cost for scaling production.  His growth share matrix is a 2×2 matrix that guides how managers should optimize their portfolios – dumping dogs, milking cows and riding stars.  Porter’s 5 Forces is about a static industrial organization theory set in the aftermath of how American companies became dominant industrial organizations – the rest of the world was still catching up after World War II in building a decent factory to compete (See W.E. Deming‘s work for details).  Neither theorist embedded the idea of experimentation or learning in their frameworks.  But consultants and managers at corporations have wielded their frameworks for much of the last 30 years.  The effects are telling.

Don’t agree with my hypthesis?  See Ngram below.  Of course you are going to argue “correlation is not causation”.  My response to that is – go ask your executive leadership how many experiments they have conducted in the last 12 months at any scale and how much of management theory from Porter and Henderson they have employed during the same period.  I rest my case.

The problem with strategic intent is that you need to know where you are going.  The reality is, you can never be certain of that.  The experimental/learning school of strategy tells you that your strategy is mostly what you see in retrospection.  Not something you can deliberately design and execute, especially for a long period of time.

HP’s roundabout on Compaq and Palm are examples of how experimentation as a corporate function has been disappearing, and case of failing big bets and fortune telling gone awry. (HP withdrew TouchPad after just 49 days on the market.  See HP’s lack of invention is why WebOS failed on Tom’s Hardware)

Steve Denning writes about how traditional management ideas lead to Why Amazon Can’t Make A Kindle in the USA.  He is no further from truth. If only managers at corporations  focused on experimentation as a strategy tool, employees would be on the path of continuous innovation across the entire value chain not within the bounds of core versus non core activities or a set of disaggregated activities tied together by marketing and sales functions.

When was the last time you placed a little bet (i.e. conducted an experiment)?